Abstract
INTRODUCTION
In an effort to support competitiveness in domestic industries, many late developing countries offer incentives based on investment in machinery and tooling, and local
R&D. The configuration of the incentives is often based on internalized judgment
Page 2 of 31 rather than on formal models, making it difficult to assess such interventions objectively and to improve on them. Formalization of such policy interventions makes explicit the factors underlying performance and can reveal high leverage policy options available to policy makers to influence performance. The paper was aimed at showing how formalization of incentives policy for competitiveness can reveal insights useful in understanding target industry performance and how it can guide subsequent improvement of such policy interventions. This was done using the case of South Africa's automotive industry and against the background of mixed performance of the industry regarding competitiveness.
Like in many developing countries, South Africa's adoption of an outward-looking industrial development policy strategy after its 1994 democratic transition was motivated, in part, by the desire to detach domestic industry performance from national economic growth [3] . It was acknowledged that the domestic market was not able to support sufficiently high production volumes that could allow efficient and competitive domestic production. Given the emphasis put on exports and foreign investment to drive national growth, international competitiveness became an important component of overall national development strategy. South Africa's policy makers hoped to emulate the successful interventions of some East Asian governments that had achieved high economic growth rates through exporting [7] . In 1995, the South African government launched a Motor Industry Development Program (MIDP) aimed at establishing a competitive industry, both locally and globally. Under the program, government provided the industry with import duty rebates based on local content exported and with a duty free allowance. The MIDP replaced a series of protection measures and local content requirements that had previously characterized the industry [3] . The main objectives of the MIDP were to increase competitiveness of the industry, encourage industry growth through export, stabilize employment levels, improve the industry's trade balance and to make vehicles more affordable in the domestic market [2] . In 2000, government introduced an investment incentive for the industry, the Productive Asset Allowance (PAA). The PAA was intended to support further efforts to make the domestic industry competitive in the long term. Investment qualifying for the PAA was widely defined to include capitalized R&D expenditure [17] . Page 
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Despite government's offer of substantial incentives to the local automotive manufacturing industry, investment in R&D remained minimal. For the first decade of the incentives offer, 1995-2004, R&D investment as a proportion of total industry investment was less than 10% on average (Table 1) . The low level of R&D in the automotive manufacturing industry was corroborated by findings of the South African Innovation survey of 2001. The survey found that South Africa's R&D expenditure as percentage of sales in the manufacturing of machinery and equipment to be 0.8% [28] .
The nature of investment realised under the MIDP was an issue of concern in as far as the industry competitiveness objective was concerned since R&D investment, as opposed to capital investment, is associated with improved industry competitiveness [37] . Investment in plant, machinery and tooling is important in the realisation of short to medium term profitability of firms, but in the long run it is the R&D investment and the subsequent potential to innovate that is likely to determine industry competitiveness [8] , [29] , [20] , [18] .
Using a system dynamics approach, the paper presents a system dynamics model as a proposed instrument in formalizing the offer of incentives, applied to the South African government's offer of incentives to the automotive manufacturing sector. The model was developed from qualitative and quantitative information on how the incentives had been structured. It was used to test how changes in the incentive policy rules affect industry performance dynamics pertaining to progress towards competitiveness.
II.
Industry competitiveness and R&D Investment: Literature review R&D can be defined as a formal improvement-driven undertaking to discover new knowledge about products, processes and services. It comprises of the bulk of creative systematic activities undertaken to increase stock of knowledge and the subsequent use of this knowledge to devise new application [9] . According to Zhouying [42] , R&D entails developing of technologies that can be commercialised under independent intellectual property rights. R&D is seen as the foundation of technology progress and sustainable competitiveness in the modern era [10] , [40] , [22] , [21] , [34] .
Competitiveness, on the other hand, refers to the ability of a firm or industry to increase in size, market share and profitability. Quoting the US Presidential Commission on Industrial Competitiveness, Clark and Guy [5] define competitiveness as "the degree to which it (a nation) can, under free and fair market conditions, produce goods and services that meet the test of international markets while simultaneously maintaining and expanding the real income of citizens".
The contemporary thinking is that the link between R&D and competitiveness is via its effect on technological development and subsequent innovation. Innovation, technological advances and country competitive advantage happen to be connected by complex multidimensional relationships [21] . It is reasoned that competitiveness depends on average production costs. Production costs are a function of price and non-price factors, some of which are R&D capabilities and the ability to adopt and use new technologies. Sustainable competitiveness depends on the ability of a country or industry to offer comparable products to its competitors at lower prices on an open market. This requires that a country or industry is able to lower its production costs without sacrificing quality. Technology innovation offers one of the most practical ways to reduce production costs while at the same time maintaining or even increasing product quality. R&D investment has a powerful positive correlation with industrial profitability, product quality, and return on investment, hence overall competitiveness [24] , [41] . R&D activities generate knowledge, which is a factor of production, as such, an indirect input in the neo-classical production function [29] .
Therefore, there is general agreement that countries seeking to enhance their international competitiveness, have to engage in domestic R&D and subsequent innovative activities [19] , [40] .
Nonetheless, the link between R&D effort, innovation, technical progress and competitiveness has to be qualified; it is not straightforward and is characterised by time lags. For competitiveness to be realised, R&D generated knowledge has to be adopted and commercialised by industry; otherwise, the knowledge remains valueless.
R&D is an input in the long process of achieving competitiveness. Like any other input in a chain of interrelated activities of a system, the relationship between input and output may be hard to establish. One has to consider time lags and control for other "competitiveness-determining" factors that simultaneously change with R&D efforts over time.
Another challenge in the R&D and competitiveness analysis relates to measuring the effectiveness of R&D. Frankema and Lindblad [10] point out that "Figures on R&D activities and numbers of people employed in R&D activities, the commonly used indicators of R&D activity, merely inform us about the scope of efforts and financial commitments but do not offer insight into the effectiveness of R&D efforts". The R&D success rate is dependent on a range of intermediary factors like knowledge management, technology absorptive capacity of the environment, and other soft technological variables. Zhouying [42] claims that soft technological factors that relate to the emergence of new business technologies and cultures, such as modern management techniques, venture capital, virtual technology, incubators, etc. constitute soft technology that provides an environment for innovation and effective application of technologies, hence attainment of competitiveness. Because of the complex relationship between R&D investment and competitiveness, governments ought to carefully develop evaluation criteria for R&D sponsored programmes in order to direct the behaviour of recipient firms [9] .
Notwithstanding concerns on R&D effort and competitiveness, there is no doubt that new knowledge drives innovation and new knowledge is rooted in R&D activities.
Innovation and technological capability are important assets for any country or industry in getting a competitive edge over its rivals in free and contestable markets.
Achieving competitiveness is closely related to and intertwined with technology progress. Stumpf & Vermaak [37] emphasise that global competitiveness is inseparably linked to productivity improvement and technology upgrade. Carayannis & Roy [4] on the other hand postulate that a firm's long-term competitiveness is directly proportional to its speed and acceleration of innovation. Global technology improvement has led to a decrease in product life cycles. Facilities, equipment and worker skills are rendered obsolete long before their useful lives have been realised [24] . In order to remain competitive, firms have to innovate continuously and need to ensure that they realise a positive return to innovation-related investment over shorter periods.
Firm expenditure on R&D and innovation activities is a long-term, high-risk form of investment but one that is necessary for industrial survival and profitable growth [24] , [30] . Because R&D and subsequent innovative activities often requires substantial investment with high risk, governments have to play a key role in encouraging and facilitating this type of investment [10] . One of the ways governments to do this is through the offer of industry incentives.
The beginning of the 21 century has also seen Multi National Corporations (MNCs) increasingly globalising their R&D activities by taking advantage of governments' support mechanisms [12] , [15] . The phenomenon has motivated more developing countries to introduce incentives and institutional arrangements that can attract investment, including R&D activities, in local economies. This is done with the expectation that government R&D incentives will have a positive effect on a country's innovation effort and subsequently on its competitiveness [13] .
Although empirical evidence on the effect of government incentives and private sector investment in R&D is still inconclusive [16] , for the South African automotive industry, with a location disadvantage, it was unlikely that the country could attract significant investment in R&D without some sort of compensatory incentives. Against this background, the South African government introduced automotive incentives for the local industry. The PAA in particular targeted state-of-art asset investment, R&D and capitalised expenditure on technical expertise. The expectation was that the incentives would encourage, fairly equally, all the forms of investment and ultimately contribute towards efforts to make the domestic industry competitive in the long term.
Ten years after the commencement of the incentives most of the investment realised was in form of plant, machinery and equipment.
The ineffectiveness of South Africa's automotive manufacturing incentives to direct investment in R&D and subsequent innovative activities necessitated a review of the automotive industry incentive model. For this to be done rigorously, however, a formal model had to exist. Like many policies in developing countries, the MIDP policy framework was based on judgment or intuition and on consensus among stakeholders. Its assumptions remained embedded in the mental models of its historical promoters, making it hard to discern internal inconsistencies. The problem with intuitive models is that they cannot be assessed scientifically to allow objective analysis and improvement [36] , [11] . In order to investigate how a change in incentive policy rules would affect industry performance dynamics in respect of the industry's competitiveness objective, a system dynamics model of the industry incentives was developed. Formalizing of intuitive mental models has a potential to expose flaws in policy conception and can reveal the effectiveness of policy levers in the model structure [36] . As a result, model formalization enhances models' quality and i n c r e a s e s t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e i r s i m u l a t i o n s , a n a s p e c t c r i t i c a l l y i m p o r t a n t f o r improvement of policy intervention [32] . The developed model provided a formal means to test how policy decisions on the MIDP incentives could affect industry competitiveness in the long term.
III.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA In the formalization of the competitiveness incentives for South Africa's automotive manufacturing industry, a system dynamics (SD) approach was used. The choice of system dynamics was motivated, in part, by the complexity of industry performance dynamics and by the need to account for feedback effects of any industry intervention.
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The workings of the MIDP incentives exhibit interrelationships between industry sectors and industry performance variables without explicit cause and effect characteristic of a complex system. External inputs to the industry, such as incentives, cannot be directly mapped to realised outcomes because of the complex interrelationships within the industry. Vennix [38] contends that the system dynamics approach is more suited to capture such relationships and feedback effects within a set of interrelated activities and processes. According to Barlas [1] and Randers [31] the system dynamics approach is more applicable to policy problems where the dynamics have to do with the internal structure of the system as it has a potential to generate understanding of how a complex system is structured and can influence the effectiveness of policy input.
It was further acknowledged that policy work is often too complicated to be reduced to definite natural science laws and econometric models [35] questions [33] .
System dynamics as a methodology is grounded in control theory and theory of n o n l i n e a r d y n a m i c s [ 3 6 ] . T h e a p p r o a c h p r o v i d e s a m e a n s t o c a p t u r e c o m p l e x relationships and feedback effects within a set of interrelated activities and processes that often characterize policy models [38] . It allows simulation of model performance under different policy rules giving some indication into potential outcomes of particular policy decisions before their implementation. Its presentation has a userfriendly interface that encourages users in practice to internalize the logic behind the model. In addition, the approach allows the use of quantitative and qualitative data; hence, it is not limited in its use when quantitative data is unavailable. Specialized Page 9 of 31 software in system dynamics modeling allows scenario simulations, in fairly easy and understandable steps, an aspect that is important in practice and in applied research.
For this project Stella software version 9.0.2 was used, as developed by the company isee systems (formerly High Performance Systems -www.iseesystems.com).
Quantitative industry performance data for estimation of model parameters and rates of change was collected from the Department of Trade and Industry, South Africa and from the National Association of Automotive Manufacturers of South Africa (NAAMSA) publications and related communications.
One of the biggest challenges in the formalizing of a policy is access to relevant qualitative data that captures the thinking behind a policy. Developing the MIDP incentive model required specific understanding of the intentions of the model promoters and the assumptions underlying the dispensation. Such data was not explicit in the numerical and written data sources. It is widely acknowledged by a number of leading authors on system dynamics modeling that the most important data required for building a system dynamics model is often qualitative [23] . Specific to policy work, subsequent formulation of a dynamic hypothesis and formulation of a qualitative model requires insight into the mental models of role players [25] , [35] .
Key variables underlying behavior of interest resides in the mental database of some of the actors [31] . Sterman [35] asserts that more often mental data cannot be accessed directly but must be elicited through interviews, observation and other methods. In order to access qualitative data, the researcher usually needs to interact with people involved in the study situation over and above the use of archival research, data collection, interviews and direct observation or participation. The research had to include means to tap into information in stakeholders' recollection of the considerations that had led to particular policy decisions. In this regard, qualitative data to support the model building process was collected using two techniques: participant observation and discourse analysis. The researcher attended MIDP policy review meetings for a period 18 months. This was followed by discourse analysis of the qualitative information gathered from observation. In the following section, the development of the model is explained via a stepwise increase in scope.
IV. THE PAA-IEC MODEL STRUCTURE
The model was constructed sequentially for the two main incentives for automotive manufacturing in South Africa, the Productive Asset Allowance (PAA) and the Import Export Complementation (IEC) scheme. The PAA incentive allows receipt of import duty rebates based on investment, while the IEC allows receipt of duty offsets based on the value of exported local content [14] .
V. THE PAA
Under the PAA, only investment in new and unused productive assets qualifies for benefit [17] . The value of assets qualifying for the PAA is therefore a proportion of total industry investment that can be captured by the equation:
where P AA I t is the PAA qualifying investment in year t, α is the PAA qualifying investment fraction and I is total annual industry investment.
Benefit from the qualifying investment takes the form of import duty rebates and is set at 20% of the qualifying investment. The value of rebates that can be generated from a particular value of qualifying investment can be presented as:
where P AA RG is the PAA rebates generated per annum and the 0.2 is the existing PAA benefit fraction.
Since the benefit from the PAA is spread over a five-year period, the value of annual rebate certificates that can be generated is according to the equation:
where RCR represents the value of rebate certificate release per year and the 5 represents the five-year period over which the PAA benefit is spread.
The value of imports that can be brought into the country using PAA rebates depends on the prevailing import duty rate and the value of rebates issued in a particular year according to the equation:
where P AA RI t is the value of imports that can be brought into the country, using the PAA rebates and IMPORTDUTY is the prevailing import duty rate in the year under consideration.
Next, the feedback effect of PAA rebates was incorporated. The first step was to make industry investment endogenous. This was done by introducing an investment rate variable. Industry investment per year was set to depend on annual investment rate i.e. One of the most important aspects of system dynamics modeling and a source of insights into system performance is the identification of feedback effects [36] . These constitute closed loops, where the level of outcomes has an effect on the level of inputs. In the PAA incentive model, two investment-determining factors were identified and introduced -domestic market and exports. Investment depends on planned production and planned production is, to a large extent, a function of projected domestic market size and export levels. Exports augment the domestic market size while imports, whether rebated or otherwise, reduce the effective domestic market. It is widely acknowledged that local market size is a major factor in investment location decisions particularly in the automotive manufacturing industry.
Jenkins & Thomas [16] mention that the size of the local market is believed to the most important motivation for establishing European subsidiary companies in Southern Africa. As is to be expected, European subsidiary companies are strongly represented in South Africa's automotive manufacturing industry.
PAA rebatable imports add to the stock of industry imports into the country on which the industry does not pay duties. Given that the only way industry could benefit from the PAA incentive is through importing and offsetting duties payable using earned rebate certificates, firms will tend to import until they have exhausted import rebates received.
To account for the effects of domestic market size, exports and PAA rebatable imports on investment, a normal-investment-growth fraction variable was introduced.
At this stage of model construction, both domestic market and exports were taken to be static. To the extent that the above three variables affect investment, actual investment growth fraction will differ from the normal growth fraction. The difference will be the effect emanating from a production potential factor (the basis of domestic production plans), which was postulated to be proportional to: (domestic market + exports -PAA rebatable imports)/ (domestic market + exports). The logic of the equation is that as long as there are no rebatable imports, investment will grow at a normal rate dictated by the size of the domestic market and export potential.
The effect of PAA rebatable imports on the production potential factor, which in turn affect the actual investment growth fraction, constitutes a closed loop of the PAA incentive model (Figure 1 
l e s s i m u l a t i o n o f t h e v a l u e o f r e b a t a b l e i m p o r t s u n d e r d i f f e r e n t s c e n a r i o s
pertaining to the PAA benefit policy rule.
As indicated previously, the import-export complementation scheme also contributes to rebatable imports. Therefore, the effect of rebatable imports on production plans was underestimated in the PAA model above, as it did not take into account additional rebatable imports generated through the IEC incentive scheme. In the following section, the model is extended to include the IEC, which also contributes to the value of rebatable imports for the industry.
VI. IMPORT-EXPORT COMPLEMENTATION MODEL STRUCTURE

U n d e r t h e I m p o r t -E x p o r t C o m p l e m e n t a t i o n , f i r m s e a r n Import Rebate Credit
Certificates (IRCCs), based on a proportion of exported local content. Exports were specified as being determined by an export growth rate, which rate was assumed to be determined exogenously -locally based vehicle assemblers' exports are largely dependent on parent company decisions. As such, the equation for industry exports per year could be presented as:
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where E t is total industry exports per annum in year t, and ß is the export growth rate fraction.
The exported value of local content is captured by the equation:
where ELC is the exported value of local content and ELCF is the exported local content fraction.
In calculating the IRCC value to be awarded to an exporting entity, the exported value of local content is discounted at a rate determined by Government. The IRCC value generated, therefore, is a function of exported local content and the exported local content beneficiation fraction as determined for a particular year. Equation (8) below captures this relationship:
where IRCCVALUE is the value of IRCCs generated per year, and LCBF the export local content beneficiation fraction.
By specification, the value of rebatable imports generated under the IEC in a particular year is equivalent to the value of IRCCs issued and is independent of the import duty rate.
Given this further adjustment, IRCCs generated under the IEC adds to the overall stock of industry rebatable imports. Thereafter, industry rebatable imports were linked to the production potential factor.
An important aspect to take note of, under the combined PAA-IEC model, is the fact that exports and the domestic market were allowed to vary over time through the introduction of respective projected growth rates. The variable "Industry imports" was specified as an endogenous variable that depended on the import decision. The domestic market and the value of rebatable imports at industry level influenced the import decision. Before a firm within the industry could import, it had to have some insight into how much imports the domestic market could absorb. After establishing the import absorption capacity of the domestic market, the firm would have to consider the almost mandatory import it has to undertake in order to make use of import rebates earned. Hence, it was postulated that the domestic market and rebatable imports were determining factors of the import decision. If there was no commensurate increase in the domestic market, there was a high likelihood that as rebatable imports increased, industry imports would also increase.
F o r c o m p l e t e n e s s o f s t r u c t u r e , t h e P
In quantifying the part of the model underlying the import decision, the impact of domestic market and rebatable imports on imports growth fraction was specified as being dependent on the ratio of industry rebatable imports and on the domestic market.
This impact declined as the value of rebatable imports tended toward the domestic market size. Figure 2 presents the extended PAA-IEC-Trade Balance model structure.
The PAA-IEC-Trade Balance model in Figure 2 could be quantified and used to simulate effects of the PAA and IEC policy variables on industry investment. It is noted that for full modeling of trade balance dynamics, the effect of another lesser production related element of the incentive package, the duty free allowance, would have to be added in a manner similar to the above process. As its contribution does not alter the logic of the model materially, it is not included to simplify the analysis. 
VII. MODEL VALIDATION AND TESTING
Model validation, as an important step in creating confidence in a model, was done before policy scenario simulations. It was acknowledged that despite the wide use of the word 'validation' in modeling literature, models cannot be validated -if validation is taken to mean establishing truthfulness of the model. This is so because all models are simplified representations of reality developed with a mindset biased towards what the model is intended to simulate and for whom it is intended. What can be validated, however, are the analytical statements and propositions derived from the axioms of closed logical systems [36] . In fact, the issue is not about the validity of the m o d e l b u t i t s u s e f u l n e s s . W h e n s y s t e m d y n a m i c s p r a c t i t i o n e r s r e f e r t o m o d e l validation, they are usually referring to ways to make the model useful and acceptable to the intended clientele, a process that is more subjective than scientific. Referring to model validation Forrester [11] 
VIII. POLICY RULE CHANGES AND IMPLICATIONS TO INDUSTRY
COMPETITIVENESS
Under the PAA, there are only two policy variables under control of Governmentthe PAA benefit fraction and the import duty. As such, policy decisions on the PAA relate fundamentally to adjusting the PAA benefit fraction and/or industry import duties. Model simulation of vehicle manufacturers' investment reveals that a change in the PAA benefit fraction has minimal influence on the investment trend. Figure 4 shows investment trend with the PAA benefit set at 0.2, 0.5 and 1.0 respectively. The insensitivity of investment to PAA benefit fractions points to the fact that investment in the country is more likely a function of domestic economic fundamentals, rather than of incentives as a particular policy lever. What is important to note is that none of the policy decisions on the MIDP incentive model, as captured in Figure 4 to Figure 7 , has a direct effect on the nature of investment. As such, the likelihood that the composition of automotive manufacturing industry investment in South Africa, as witnessed in the first 10 years of MIDP incentives, would change in the foreseeable future is minimal.
IX. INSIGHTS AND CONCLUSION
South Africa, being located at the southern end of the African continent, has a location disadvantage in terms of transport costs to and from major international Well-intentioned policy interventions aimed at supporting industry competitiveness end up not yielding envisaged outcomes as a result of failure to have inbuilt policy levers that can influence a targeted industry to behave in a way that puts it on a competitiveness path. Many developing countries appreciate the need to become competitive and put in place various forms of incentives to motivate industry efforts towards competitiveness. However, many of the supportive policy frameworks lack practical policy levers to channel investment in R&D and innovative activities.
Moreover, systemic factors, interdependencies and feedback effects within the industry that have a bearing on industry behaviour are often not taken into account. Specific to investment incentives, it is imperative to note that firm investment is not homogenous in as far as industry competitiveness is concerned. The nature of enabled investment by way of offer of incentives or subsidies has a bearing on a particular industry's progress towards global competitiveness. In particular, innovation related expenditure is more correlated with attainment of competitiveness [39] . The effectiveness of incentives in supporting an industry's progress towards competitiveness, therefore, cannot be adjudicated without considering the nature of investment it enables. Parties involved in initiating and implementing incentives for competitiveness should consider explicitly how the proposed incentives would motivate investment that supports the competitiveness objective. The paper shows how formal modelling of incentive policy, using a system dynamics approach, can reveal whether a suggested incentive model has inbuilt policy levers to influence the nature of investment and hence can support industry competitiveness.
The modelling process had limitations that ought to be acknowledged even though not considered significant to change the paper's contributions. First, the model was not accurate in point prediction of investment overtime. However, since the model could replicate the general investment trend, it was considered acceptable. This was typical of system dynamics modelling that tend to emphasise replication of overall trend of a research aspect of interest rather than point prediction. The paper did not discuss calibration process and resulting parameters. Although such a discussion could increase confidence in the model, it was considered outside the scope of the paper.
Moreover, the discussion had a potential to distract attention of a reader from the key objective of the paper. Similarly, the paper did not have a separate section focussing on model testing to reveal potential structural flaws. While structural testing was plausible from a theoretical perspective, it was not considered critical since the model was developed based on 'actual' structuring of the incentives, and taking into account administrative rules. Based the factual information, structural flaws in the model were less likely. Last, it would have been appropriate for the reference mode behaviour to relate to R&D investment and not industry investment in general. Doing so was constrained, however, by the fact that the incentive model was configured in such a way that investment was regarded as homogenous. The model was developed to capture, as closely as possible, the actual working of the incentive scheme. As a result, it could not simulate data pertaining to R&D in isolation. The paper tried to circumvent this limitation by first establishing that the model had no internal means to influence nature of enabled investment. Based on this, it could be deduced that investment in R&D was likely to remain less than 10% of total industry investment irrespective of level of investment.
